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Introduction
The Patent and Copyright Clause—the choice of name is itself
instructive—is the source of many interpretive and practical difficulties.
Like all clauses of the Constitution, it is short, and it is precisely in its
brevity that much of its difficulty arises. Thus, the familiar clause reads:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]1

†

The Laurence A Tisch Professor of Law, The New York University School
of Law, The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover
Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of
Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago. This paper
was initially prepared for a Conference on the Historical Origins of the
Patent Clause, which was scheduled to be held on March 13–14 (2020)
organized by the Classical Liberal Institute and held at NYU Law School.
That conference never took place but the paper was presented online to
the conference participants and benefited greatly from their comments. I
have also benefitted from comments received at the NYU Work in
Progress workshop held on November 2, 2020. My thanks to Kenneth Lee,
Christian McGuire, Micah Quigley, and Riley Walters, of the University
of Chicago Law School. I offer a special word of thanks to Tomás GómezArostegui, whose knowledge of the relevant sources is seemingly
inexhaustible, for his wise guidance on reviewing much of the historical
material.

1.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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As the title to this article indicates, I shall engage in some sort of
a quasi-originalist inquiry into the proper interpretation of this clause,
in an effort to find out how it was understood during the founding
period. I shall largely restrict myself to the patent line of cases. The
evidence will in some cases go beyond that period to cover nineteenthcentury cases which offer an accurate reflection of the earlier thinking,
insofar as they exhibit no intention to alter the law from the way in
which it was originally formed. The issue is of no little importance
because the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
tended to take a restrictive view of the rights of patentees, and the
protection of patents under the law. Both Mayo Collaborative Services
v. Prometheus Laboratories2 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inter–
national3 gave narrow accounts of the class of potential inventions that
should be regarded as patent-eligible under Section 101 of the Patent
Act,4 in the case of medical tests on the one hand, and financial analysis
on the other.5 The case of Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s
2.

566 U.S. 66 (2012). The issue discussed is orthogonal to the question of
whether patents offer property rights. Instead, it holds that a method for
calculating proper dosage of thiopurine to treat autoimmune diseases
should be treated as an unpatentable law of nature. Id. at 72–73. The case
represents a weird expansion of laws of nature to cover tests in particular
context that require huge ingenuity to discover, and which cannot be
simply derived as a matter of first principle from a set of formal axioms.

3.

573 U.S. 208 (2014). For an application of its rule, see American Axle &
Manufacturing, Inc. v. NEAPCO Holdings LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 218, 223–
24, 228–29 (D. Del. 2018) (holding that the Alice-Mayo framework inval–
idates a method patent on how to construct and operate an automobile
driveshaft as a law of nature).

4.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”); Mayo, 556 U.S. at 86–87;
Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17.

5.

For a critique, see The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part 1:
Before the S. Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement
of Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, George Mason University). For a
defense of the current system, see The State of Patent Eligibility in
America: Part II: Before the S. Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., 116th Cong.
(2019) (statement of David W. Jones, Exec. Dir., High Tech Inventors
All.) (insisting that Alice-Mayo has not reduced investment in either
biomedical or financial patents). For cases invalidating medical tests, see,
for example, Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,
LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that a medical test used
to identify various neurological disorders is patent ineligible because the
test is classified as a natural law and lacks a transformative element);
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (holding that a non-invasive prenatal DNA test is similarly excluded
on patent ineligibility grounds).
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Energy Group, LLC6 holds that a patentee is not entitled to a jury trial
in an Article III court to determine patent validity in an infringement
action if the defendant moves the adjudication before the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (which is staffed by administrative judges appointed
by the head of the Patent and Trademark Office).7 Finally, eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, LLC8 imposes important limitations on the ability of
a patent holder to obtain an injunction, even in the case of deliberate
patent infringement.9
The explanation for these diverse patent-restrictive decisions all
stem in large part from the deep convictions of patent skeptics on the
Supreme Court, backed by many industry and academic supporters,
who believe that patent rights are to some extent second-class rights
that are not entitled to the level of protection that is associated with
the ownership of land, chattels, or animals, which have an indubitable
common law heritage.10 It is important to note the rejection of this
second-class status for patents (and copyrights) should not be regarded
as equivalent to the proposition that these rights are absolute in all
respects, because statements of that sort are not true of land or of any
other forms of tangible property rights. The overall system of property
rights is highly sensitive to the types of assets in play, even in cases
where both assets are tangible—for example, the property rules for
water are different from those for land. In addition, under the standard
definitions, the exclusive rights to possession, use, and disposition11 are

6.

138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).

7.

Id. at 1370–79 (“[I]nter partes review is a matter that Congress can
properly assign to the PTO, a jury is not necessary in these proceedings.”).

8.

547 U.S. 388 (2006).

9.

See id. at 390.

10.

See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?
The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, in Copy Fights:
the Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age
43, 43–44 (Adam Thierer, Clyde Wayne Crews & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr.
eds., 2002).

11.

See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945).
In speaking about the definition of property in cases of eminent domain,
the critical terms are “property,” “taken” and “just compensation.” It is
conceivable that the first was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of
the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights
recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a
more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s
relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of
it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase, property, has been
the latter. Id. Note that the inference is irresistible that this same set of
rights applies to patents, which also receive eminent domain protection.
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still subject to abridgment in cases of necessity.12 Such rights are also
capable of transformation with changes in technology, as with the
transformation of air rights when the upper air space, which formerly
had no value, became useful for transformation.13 This topic deserves
an extensive treatment of its own.14 All of these transformations may
happen with different forms of intellectual property, but this entire
ethos of transformation does not make sense if the exercise of the patent
power is treated as a general right to exclude, without embracing the
ability to alienate and license, or as a government subsidy that can be
offered and removed at will. The originalist account does not purport
to deal with every permutation in how patent rights are assigned and
developed. But it does impose this important set of guard rails against
the total elimination of patent protection by legislative or admin–
istrative action.
Property rights in these material assets are widely regarded as
having a natural law grounding insofar as their creation is said to
antedate the rise of the state and its enforcement of property rights,
which is an essential feature of the Lockean tradition under which
property rights come from below, after which they are protected by the
state.15 That position resonates with Madison’s general statement about
the relationship of copyright to patent in Federalist 43, which reads:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy–
right of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to
be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems
with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good
fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The
States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of
the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this
point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.16

The common law foundations for copyright were adjudicated at
great length in Millar v. Taylor,17 and Madison’s observation is that
now that patents and copyrights are linked together in the same clause,
the same level of protection for the same reason should be given to
patents. That protection should be at the federal level because it is far
12.

Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908); Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation
Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).

13.

Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); Swetland v.
Curtiss Airports Corp. 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).

14.

See Richard A. Epstein, Legal Transitions Between Property Rights Regimes
for Different Resources (forthcoming).

15.

See Palmer, supra note 10, at 58.

16.

The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison).

17.

(1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201; 4 Burr. 2303 (KB).
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more efficient to offer intellectual property protection once throughout
the United States instead of doing so by multiple arguably inconsistent
state laws. Federalist No. 43 also resonates with James Madison’s short
1792 essay in the National Gazette, Property,18 which refers to “that
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in exclusion of every other individual.”19 Madison’s essay
does not mention intellectual property, but it does advert to
Blackstone’s famous definition of property in the first sentence.20
Against that position is the famous letter of Thomas Jefferson that
made this oft-quoted remark: “[I]t would be curious then if an idea, the
fugitive fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be
claimed in exclusive and stable property.”21 But if it is not the
“fermentation” of any given mental state that is protected; it is the
durable plan and description of the invention that derives from that
mental effort. To be sure, natural law theory could not provide the
institutional arrangements needed to protect intellectual property,
which is one reason why it makes sense to call these rights “created”
rather than “inherent.” Moreover, Edward Walterscheid is surely
correct when he notes that the Constitution did not obligate the federal
government to create either patent or copyright protection, but only
authorized the creation of these rights22—which is how the text, which
describes a power of Congress, reads. Put otherwise, there was no
common law or constitutional right to obtain a patent, which was a
“privilege” from the government.23 But Madison used the explicit
18.

James Madison, Property, Nat’l Gazette, Mar. 29, 1792, https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0238, [https://perma.cc/5BJE4VBF].

19.

Id. (quoting 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *1, *2).

20.

Id.

21.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 326 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903). For
a critique of Jefferson’s view, see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in
Historical Context, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 953, 959–67 (2007). Mossoff tends
to use natural law theories in opposition to consequentialist ones. I have long
taken the opposite view, that utilitarian justifications do not undermine the
strength of a natural law theory. For the explicit interrelationship between
natural law and utilitarian theory in classical theory, see Richard A. Epstein,
The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
711 (1989).

22.

Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the
Intellectual Property Clause, 19 Hamline L. Rev. 81, 94, 98–99 (1995).
According to Walterscheid, Madison “intended the term ‘securing’ to mean
‘to obtain’ or ‘to provide’ rather than ‘to insure’ or ‘to affirm and protect.’”
Id. at 98.

23.

Id.
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analogy between patents and copyrights to supply the intellectual
ammunition to explain why in constitutional terms it was thought
necessary to have a constitutional vehicle for the protection of both sets
of rights. And it is surely noteworthy that at no time in our
Constitution’s history has Congress ever declined the invitation to
legislate pursuant to its constitutional power.
It is therefore not surprising that the natural law definitions of
property rights did influence state law protections for intellectual
property prior to the adoption of the Constitution. The direct cases
dealing with this issue again come from copyright law, under statutes
that make explicit reference to the natural law tradition.24 Thus, in 1783
Connecticut passed an “Act for the encouragement of literature and
genius” that was explicitly rooted in natural law principles.25 The
Massachusetts Act of the same year “for the Purpose of securing to
Authors the exclusive Right and Benefit of publishing their Literary
Productions for Twenty-one years,” invoked both natural rights theory
and the desirable incentive effects of property in the same breath.26
Similar language is found in the Virginia Law of 1785 and the New
York Law of 1786.27 These statutes have language parallel to Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8.
On the basis of these early decisions Paul Clement, in his recent
article Patent Rights vs. Property,28 explicitly draws a sharp contrast
between property rights and patent protection in order to explain and
justify the reduced level of protection offered in recent Supreme Court
cases, especially Oil States.29 I believe that all of those Supreme Court
cases and similar decisions represent a serious break from a sound view
of patents that make them a subclass of property rights—which can
and should be enforced on a par with other forms of property rights
once a particular patentee has received a patent grant.30 The simplest
24.

Id. at 88–89.

25.

1783 Conn. Pub. Acts 133–34.

26.

1783 Mass. Acts 369.

27.

1785 Va. Acts 8–9; 1786 N.Y. Laws 99–100. For references to these laws,
see Randolph May & Seth L. Cooper, The Constitutional Foun–
dations of Intellectual Property: A Natural Rights Perspective
44–46 (2015).

28.

Paul C. Clement, Patent Rights vs. Property, The Framer’s Understanding
of Patents (2019), https://www.hightechinventors.com/post/read-former-us-solicitor-general-paul-clement-s-new-paper-on-the-constitutional-purposeof-patents [https://perma.cc/HBH6-NZR5]. The paper was apparently pre–
pared at the behest of the High Tech Inventors Alliance.

29.

Id. at 16–17.

30.

For more discussion of these general views, see Richard A. Epstein, The
Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to
a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 455 (2010). See also Richard A.
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statement of the argument is that under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,
the government has the power to either grant or not grant patents in
any particular case.31 Indeed, in 1790 the United States did not have to
enact any Patent Act at all, but it in fact affirmatively enacted the first
Patent Act.32
There is, however, this huge caveat. Once the government issues a
patent, that patent becomes—full stop—a form of property on a par
with other forms of property, in part because the grant is in harmony
with the natural law tradition that pervades the area.33 This claim of
vested rights pursuant to a patent grant does not require modern
readers to solve any deep mystery, because the language of the 1790
Patent Act speaks in an idiom that is as easily recognized today as it
was then. Thus, the patent is not a free grant from the government to
whomever might request it. The grant is issued not as an act of
government largesse but because of the work that the applicant has
done to obtain the patent—namely, “that he, she, or they, hath or have
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, and
praying that a patent may be granted therefor.”34 Later on in Section
Epstein, What Is so Special About Intangible Property? The Case for
Intelligent Carryovers, in Competition Policy and Patent Law
Under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation 42, 42–73 (Geoffrey A.
Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011).
31.

See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973) (“While the
area in which Congress may act is broad, the enabling provision of Clause
8 does not require that Congress act in regard to all categories of materials
which meet the constitutional definitions.”).

32.

Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.

33.

I have developed this theme in multiple places. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, Property Rights and Governance Strategies: How Best to Deal with
Land, Water, Intellectual Property, and Spectrum, 14 Colo. Tech. L.J.
181 (2016); Richard A. Epstein, From Natural Law to Social Welfare:
Theoretical Principles and Practical Applications, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1743,
1744–52 (2015) (detailing the natural law tradition with respect to property
rights). Note that property rights in land, chattels, and animals are not
mere usufructuary rights as Gaius wrote because agriculture, which requires
long term investment in land, has long, to coin an expression, taken root.
The usufructuary interest in land only applies in a hunter-gatherer society.
Thus, by extension, patents are not usufructuary rights. See Kai Yi Xie,
Comment, Improving the Patent System by Encouraging Intentional
Infringement: The Beneficial Use Standard of Patents, 165 U. Penn. L.
Rev. 1019, 1036 (2017).

34.

Patent Act of 1790 § 1 (emphasis added). The current statute is still
intricately connected to the original 1790 Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018)
(“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).
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2, the Act goes one step further and states that the grantee or grantees
of the patent:
[S]hall, at the time of granting the same, deliver to the Secretary
of State a specification in writing, containing a description,
accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and models
(if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a model)
of the thing or things, by him or them invented or
discovered . . . .35

The rationale for these provisions is the same as it is under the
modern Act. A patent does give an exclusive right, and the Patent Act
of 1790 tries to ensure that the right shall not be given away too
cheaply. Hence, in addition to making something of value, the patent
applicant must disclose information that allows others to use that
invention as a template upon which they can devise some other device
that does not fall within the scope of the patent, but nonetheless can
compete with it in the marketplace. The exclusive right, therefore, on
this model is not a monopoly over a given field, a point repeatedly
recognized in the nineteenth century cases.36 It is a form of right that
is compatible with the creation of the exclusive rights in other
35.

Patent Act of 1790 § 2.

36.

See, e.g., Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 442 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874)
(No. 1,434) (Swayne, Circuit Justice) (dealing with a combined thrashing
and hulling machine). In Birdsall, Circuit Justice Swayne wrote:
Inventors are a meritorious class of men. They are not monopolists
in the odious sense of that term. They take nothing from the
public. They contribute largely to its wealth and comfort. Patent
laws are founded on the policy of giving to them remuneration for
the fruits, enjoyed by others, of their labor and their genius. Their
patents are their title deeds, and they should be construed in a
fair and liberal spirit, to accomplish the purpose of the laws under
which they are issued.
Id. at 444. Note the use of the term “title deeds.” The case then held that
the reissue was valid because it was a new and useful invention, and that
it covered modifications of the machine that today would be covered by
the doctrine of equivalents. Id. See also Allen v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476,
477 (C.C.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 225) (McLean, Circuit Justice) (considering
the setting of mineral teeth on metallic plates). In Allen, Circuit Justice
McLean writes:
Patentees are not monopolists. . . . No exclusive right can be
granted for anything which the patentee has not invented or
discovered. . . . [T]he law repudiates a monopoly. The right of the
patentee entirely rests on his invention or discovery of that which
is useful, and which was not known before. And the law gives him
the exclusive use of the thing invented or discovered, for a few
years, as a compensation for “his ingenuity, labor, and expense in
producing it.” Id. at 477.
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inventions that could be used in competition with it, just as the owner
who has the exclusive right to one plot of land cannot thereby block his
or her neighbor from using his or her property for a purpose that
competes with his own.
When these pieces are put together, it becomes clear that a grant
is not a free gift of government. Instead it only issues if the Secretary
of State, of War, or the Attorney General, or any two of them “shall
deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important.”37
Indeed, in the 1790 Act, some variation of the word grant (e.g.
“grantee” or “granting”) is used ten times, and, in each case, the term
has the same meaning that it does in ordinary English when the transfer
of land takes place from a private grantor to a private grantee.38 The
same term, grant, also applies to the transfer of other property rights
in Common Law, such as the right of a patron landowner to request
the appointment of a nominee to an ecclesiastical beneficence under old
English law,39 and as a more modern example, the right to vest power
to either a private trustee or a legislative body.40 At this point, the
correct mode of interpretation is that any grantee under the act has the
same right as any grantee in any other area. The distinctive feature
about a patent for an invention or discovery is that the subject matter
of the patent is in no sense in the possession of the United States prior
to the time that the patent is granted. In this context, the “letters
patent” issued are not identical to the transfer of, say, lands that the
government already owns, which was the source of a huge amount of

37.

Patent Act of 1790 § 1.

38.

Id. §§ 1–5.

39.

See generally F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common
Law 32–33 (Alfred H. Chaytor & William J. Whittaker eds., 1958).

40.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives.”). Note the use of the terms “granted” and
“vested,” both property conceptions, which carry over well to public trust
arrangements. On the close connection, see Gary Lawson, Geoffrey P.
Miller, Robert G. Natelson & Guy I. Seideman, The Origins of the
Necessary and Proper Clause 52, 53 (2010). Natelson discusses several
common principles that underlay eighteenth-century fiduciary law: 1) “The
Duty to Follow Instructions and Remain Within Authority;” 2) “The Duties
of Loyalty and Good Faith;” 3) “The Duty of Care;” 4) “The Duty to
Exercise Personal Discretion;” 5) “The Duty to Account;” and 6) “The Duty
of Impartiality.” Id. at 56–60. Elsewhere Natelson has written: “I have not
been able to find a single public pronouncement in the constitutional debate
contending or implying that the comparison of government officials and
private fiduciaries was inapt. The fiduciary metaphor seems to rank just
below ‘liberty’ and ‘republicanism’ as an element of the ideology of the day.”
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 Buff. L.
Rev. 1077, 1086 (2004). So too with respect to grants.
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nineteenth-century law.41 It is rather a constitutive act, which creates
the property right because the individual in question has met the
conditions set out in the Act.
This historical account of patent rights as property interests has
been also challenged by Mark Lemley, who rejects any natural-law
foundation of patent rights.42 Indeed, his own account of the subject
goes far afield and tentatively takes the tenuous position that patents
should not be regarded as property rights but as subsidies granted by
the government. He thus writes:
Intellectual property is a form of government subsidy, designed
to influence supply in the market away from the competitive norm
just as support from the National Endowment of the Arts, the
National Institutes of Health, or crop supports to farmers are.
Recognizing this fact may be useful because it helps us to
understand the comparison between this form of subsidy and
other sorts of rewards, an area on which there is a burgeoning
literature.43

He also opines:
The fundamental differences between intellectual property rights
and other forms of government subsidy have to do with how the
recipients of that subsidy are selected and the size of the subsidy
determined. While with most government subsidies the
government makes both choices, in the case of intellectual
property the government leaves those decisions to the very
market it is attempting to influence. Because many criticisms of
government subsidies focus on size and allocation, they may not
apply to intellectual property.44
41.

See, e.g., United States v. Ala. Great S.R.R. Co., 142 U.S. 615, 621 (1892)
(“We think the contemporaneous construction thus given by the executive
department of the government, and continued for nine years through six
different administrations of that department—a construction which, though
inconsistent with the literalism of the act, certainly consorts with the equities
of the case—should be considered as decisive in this suit.”). Note that the
course of dealing rule here was in tension with the literal interpretation. For
a discussion of the general rules on grants, see Aditya Bamzai, The Origins
of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L.J. 908 (2017).
Note also that the decision has important implications for Chevron v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and F.C.C. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545
U.S. 967 (2005), which take the opposite position, so that any last-minute
shift in policy, whether or not explained, receives deference.

42.

See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2005).

43.

Id. at 1073–74 (emphasis in original).

44.

Id. at 1073.
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Despite Lemley’s evident doubt about this position, the upshot is
the same as Clement’s. Intellectual property rights, once granted, are
not to be treated as if they were property rights entitled to strong
constitutional protection. Instead, like other subsidies, they remain
more malleable by far.
Nonetheless, it is not sufficient to be suspicious of Lemley’s analogy
between intellectual property and government subsidies. It is important
to reject it altogether. Lemley recognizes that the analogy is at best
imperfect because in a patent system the applicant, not the govern–
ment, secures the property right in question, so that the political
economy of patents is different from that, say, of agricultural subsi–
dies.45 Yet what Lemley does not acknowledge is that, because of this
massive distinction, his effort to degrade property rights into political
subsidies falls of its own weight. But by referring to a “subsidy,” he
misses the central point, which is that the grant of the exclusive right
is a win/win bargain between the public and the inventor. Not so with
subsidies. All subsidies, whether in cash or in kind, result in the transfer
of some asset in the possession of the government to some chosen
beneficiary who does nothing in exchange. The patent, in contrast, does
not result from a transfer of any preexisting state asset to private
ownership, but from the submission of an invention that meets the
general standards of patentability. Those standards, if met, imply that
the wealth of the nation is greater with the issuance of the patent than
it was before. It is therefore not possible to apply the standard criticism
of subsidies to patent creation, namely: that the tax that is imposed
either on the general public or, as by cross-subsidy to others, unduly
reduces the supply of the taxed good while it unduly increases the
supply of the subsidized products, leading to a distortion that is not
found in competitive market. That objection can be raised decisively
against various proposals to give broad-based tax subsidies in place of
or in addition to patents, but it cannot be raised against the granting
of patents themselves.46
Indeed, the view that intellectual property rights should be treated
like subsidies recently received a decisive refutation from the United
States Supreme Court in Matal v. Tam,47 when the Supreme Court held
that the free speech protections that normally apply to speech also fully
applied to Tam’s application for the name of his Rock group, “The

45.

See id.

46.

See Daniel Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patent Prizes
Debate, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 303 (2013), effectively criticized in Charles
Delmotte, The Case Against Tax Subsidies in Innovation Policy, 48 Fla. R.
Rev. (forthcoming 2021).

47.

137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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Slants.”48 Tam chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and
“drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons.”49
The government’s claim, a cousin of Lemley’s idea in the patent
context, was that Tam sacrificed his constitutional rights of free speech
by submitting his claim for the subsidy of trademark protection from
the Patent and Trademark Office.50 The Court rejected this argument,
explaining that, though the government spends money on trademarks,
trademark registration is “nothing like the [subsidy] programs at issue”
in other cases.51 Once again, the trademark bargain gives exclusive right
to a name or mark in perpetuity52 because only with exclusivity will the
mark give consumers information as to the origin, and through that,
the quality of the goods purchased. There is no monopoly exclusion of
end uses which drives the law to give only limited terms of protection
to the user, so that it is in the social, as well as the private, interest
that trademarks should be protected in perpetuity. Thus, the use of
property language captures a reality that the use of subsidy language
conveniently obscures. And it is against this general background that
the originalist inquiry has to be undertaken.

I. Cautious Originalism.
In light of these efforts to undermine the status of patents, it is
important to take a closer look at the particular components of the
Patent Clause. In this area, the inquiry is originalist in this limited
sense: the analysis begins with the ordinary public meaning of the text
as understood at the time the Constitution was signed. There are many
cases where this approach has shortcomings that should be noted at the
outset. The first of these is that it is often the case that a text is
incomplete because of some implicit background assumptions that must
be brought to the fore. Thus, it could well be that some terms in a
particular provision—like “marque” and “reprisal”—have specialized
meanings that are well understood within the profession, but are not of

48.

Id. at 1747.

49.

Id.

50.

See id. at 1760 (“We next address the Government’s argument that this
case is governed by cases in which this Court has upheld the consti–
tutionality of government programs that subsidized speech expressing a
particular viewpoint.”).

51.

Id. at 1761.

52.

See United States Patent and Trademark Office, “What is a Trademark?”
(last modified Sept. 25, 2020) (“A trademark registration may remain in
force for potentially unlimited consecutive ten-year periods as long as the
owner meets the legal requirements for post-registration maintenance and
renewal and timely files all necessary documents.”).
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common use.53 More fundamentally, virtually all procedural and sub–
stantive provisions of the Constitution are subject to a non-textual gloss
that cannot be gotten or understood from parsing the text itself. For
example, the pervasive notion of the police power in all substantive and
procedural areas means that any particular claim may be subject to a
set of qualifications.54 Thus, it may be wrong to abridge the freedom of
speech, but it is not wrong to impose civil or criminal liability for
defamation, incitement to riot, fraud, intimidation, and the like.
That catalogue of exceptions to the free speech provision is not
some random assortment of deviations. Rather, they all stem from the
notion that any claim of an individual freedom is subject to limitations
that come from the standard libertarian playbook that—in this limited
compass at least—recognizes that speech used in aid of force or fraud
is no more protected by the Constitution of the United States than it
is protected by the common law.55 To that a gloss is generally added
that makes it clear that the freedom in question is not exempt from the
antitrust laws,56 or from general common carrier rules.57 Nor is there
any reason why, if high transaction costs block voluntary arrangements,
53.

See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

54.

See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116, 122 (1873)
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. These
are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of
law, and which can only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can
only be modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual
good of all . . . . This right to choose one’s calling is an essential part of
that liberty which it is the object of government to protect; and a calling,
when chosen, is a man’s property and right. . . . A law which prohibits a
large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from following
a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as
well as property, without due process of law.”). For a discussion of
limitations on police power within the takings and due process context, see
William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1057, 1057–58 (1980).

55.

For my views on how the process of implication should work, see generally
Richard A. Epstein, Our Implied Constitution, 53 Willamette L. Rev.
295 (2017).

56.

See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“The First
Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the
Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary.”).

57.

See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (“[A] telephone
company, being in the nature of a common carrier, was bound to render an
equal service to all who applied and tendered the compensation fixed by law
for the service; that while the patentees were under no obligation to license
the use of their inventions by any public telephone company, yet, having
done so, they were not at liberty to place restraints upon such a public
corporation which would disable it to discharge all the duties imposed upon
companies engaged in the discharge of duties subject to regulation by law.”).
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it should be impermissible to use compulsory licensing schemes so long
as just compensation is provided.
Similarly, there is nothing in the patent clause of the Constitution
that talks about the ability to set aside patents on the ground that they
were obtained by improper means. Thus Section 5 of the 1790 Act
builds that notion into the statute that allows judges to set aside any
patent that “was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion,”
which indicates that certain publicity and fraud-control provisions
nowhere mentioned in the Constitution are seamlessly integrated into
the basic structure of the 1790 Act.58 To an ardent textualist those
inclusions might seem unauthorized, but anyone who has worked with
statutory material under either Roman or early common law knows
that implications of this sort were common statutory practices before
1787, and it was understood at the founding that the Constitution, with
its broad grants of power, must be read as subject to these implied
limitations.59
The point here, it must be stressed, is not an open invitation to a
“living constitution,” which has so many degrees of freedom that at any
point in time it is possible to turn any clause of the Constitution upside
down.60 But the police power implications, the rules dealing with
unconstitutional conditions, or the implied immunities are the stuff of
everyday constitutional interpretation whose substantive contours were
roughly the same at the time of the Founding as they are today. Why?
Because the corrections that they authorize stem from one set of basic
principles, which are as valid today as they were in earlier times. For a
simple benchmark, the law of sales and partnerships surely has
improved since Roman times, but the Romans’ central contributions to
that body of law survive quite well in a modern setting. The reason is
that while the subject of complex transactions may change from togas
to spacesuits, the standard warranties of merchantability and title are
as good today as they were in earlier times. Hence the question of
implication, as in dealing with the rules for obtaining patent by fraud
or material nondisclosure, follow closely to historical standards. Any
system of originalism that seeks to rule out these elements from the
larger picture is not faithful to the interpretive stance of the past. With
these issues in mind, it is now useful to look closely first at the
58.

Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111.

59.

Epstein, supra note 55, at 309. Note that the method here described is
likely compatible with “original methods originalism,” which seeks to
understand the Constitution by employing the same interpretive methods
which were commonly in use at the time of its ratification. See John O.
McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103
N.W. L. Rev. 751 (2009).

60.

For one modern defense, see Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism
(2011).

712

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Patent Originalism

background assumptions to the Patent Clause, and then to the
interpretive analysis of all its moving parts.

II. Are Patents Regulated by Natural Law?
One of the constant themes of the modern patent critics is that
patents necessarily form a second tier of rights because they are not
recognized at natural law. There are, of course, many statements in
extrajudicial writings and opinions that make this point, but it is
important to place them in context, by noting first and foremost that
no one is claiming that these rights exist solely by natural law, but
rather they exist because of the grants made by the United States
pursuant to the Patents Clause. Thus, one of the most famous remarks
of this sort is found in the writings of Thomas Jefferson, who stated:
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from
them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to
the will and convenience of the society, without claim or
complaint from any body.61

Yet that was precisely the logic that was used in the states that
offered protection for copyrights before the adoption of the
Constitution, which was, as noted above, a mixture of natural law that
was always keenly aware of the incentive arguments. Clement
understates the status of patents when he writes:
[P]atent rights are not natural rights, they do not come from the
common law, and they have no basis in the tradition of property
rights tracing back to John Locke. To the contrary, a patent is a
form of government regulation that restrains members of the
public in the exercise of their natural rights to liberty and
property—rights that do come from nature and are protected by
the common law.62

Ironically, Clement misses the huge common law component of
patents. As Giles Rich pointed out long ago, the only thing that that
the federal government gives through the patent grant is the right to
exclude others from making or selling the patented invention.63 But the
61.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 175, 181 (Henry A. Washington
ed., 1854).

62.

Clement, supra note 28, at 1.

63.

Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the AntiMonopoly Laws, 24 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 159, 168 (1942) (approvingly
quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1853), in which the
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inventor gets his own right to make and sell not from the federal
government (with its limited powers) but from state common law that
applies with the same force to the patented invention as it does to any
other good or service.64 If the right to make and sell other things has a
common law origin, and if the common law has the natural law at its
core, then the guts of any patent licensing system has the same naturallaw origin as the rights to liberty and property that Clement concedes
“do come from nature and are protected by the common law,” and
which are then protected from confiscation under the federal
Constitution.65
In light of this history, it is simply a mistake to call patents either
a form of government regulation or subsidy when the Patent Act treats
them as a grant. In particular, a “restraint” does not give a party the
right to license or sell the subject matter. It just says what the restricted
party may not do. But clearly the value of patents comes in large
measure from the ability to introduce them into commerce by voluntary
transactions. On this score, I take the position, reflected in nineteenthcentury cases,66 that transacting parties to any patent deal should be
able to attach what terms and conditions they wish on patents, so that
the original owner can control the devolution of property rights, much

Court said, “[t]he franchise which the patent grants consists altogether in
the right to exclude every one from making, using or vending the thing
patented without the permission of the patentee” (emphasis in original)).
64.

See id. at 172 (describing the “[r]ights to make, use, or vend” as “‘natural’
or common law rights,” and going on to say that “[s]ince [these rights] do
not involve the exercise of any right to exclude, they are not and cannot be
the exercise of any right given by the patent statutes”).

65.

Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972):
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.
Id. at 577. Note that the full composition of patents (and copyrights) is a
composite of state and federal law.

66.

See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 88–89 (1902) (“The
plaintiff, according to the finding of the referee, was at the time when
these licenses were executed the absolute owner of the letters patent
relating to the float spring tooth harrow business. It was, therefore, the
owner of a monopoly recognized by the Constitution and by the statutes
of Congress. An owner of a patent has the right to sell it or to keep it; to
manufacture the article himself or to license others to manufacture it; to
sell such article himself or to authorize others to sell it.”).
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as the owner of land can do so through covenants and easements.67 To
call these robust grants mere restrictions on the rights of others makes
no more sense for intellectual property than it does for land grants,
which also restrict other people from trenching on the exclusive rights
of the grantee. Indeed, any recognition of private property necessarily
restricts the ability of others by limiting their natural rights to wander
unimpeded around the face of the globe.68 The simple point here is that
Jefferson is surely right to say that patents require a government grant.
But he has not said, nor could he say, that once the grant is given
patents are not protected to the same degree as common law rights of
property. The positive law, as it were, has filled any gap in the common
law.
Clement, Lemley, and others writing from this point of view are
also wrong to think that the natural-law tradition at common law does
not have the same utilitarian foundations as it does for patent law. For
starters, the only reason why patents cannot be property rights “in
nature” is that nature does not have social institutions that allow for
these rights to be defined, recorded, and enforced. Indeed, early on,
without the existence of reproducible technologies, there would be no
reason for a patent law at all. But by the same token, it must be
observed that in a state of nature the property rights that are obtained
by occupation—first possession—of things that were unowned in the
state nature did not follow from any ineluctable law that said such
forms of property had to be recognized.69 There is indeed a huge, longstanding literature that attacks the very notion that any given
individual can use his unilateral power of possession to subject some–
thing to private ownership without the consent of others.70 Thus, many

67.

Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical
Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 503–08
(2010). The case law tends to run the other way, as in Quanta Computer,
Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637–38 (2007) (adopting the
“exhaustion” doctrine to bar patentee’s suit against the subsequent lawful
purchaser of the patented item).

68.

For a discussion of these parallels, see generally Richard A. Epstein,
Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42
San Diego L. Rev. 1 (2005).

69.

For the basic texts, see G. Inst. 2.66 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson
trans., 1988); J. Inst. 2.1.12 (J. B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913).

70.

See, e.g., Richard Schlatter, Private Property: The History of
an Idea 130, 154 (1951) (“In fact, the ‘own’ which the laws of property
protect is whatever an individual has managed to get hold of, and equality
of right, applied to property, means only that every man has an equal right
to grab. . . . The problem, then, was to show how it came about that when
one man took a portion of the common stock, the rest of mankind was
obliged to respect that portion as his private property.”). See also
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people erroneously think that the occupation of any tract of land is a
usurpation of the rights of others to use that property. This mistake
finds its precise analogue in Clement’s work when he claims:
The Supreme Court has also been a consistent voice in the chorus
stressing that patents represent a derogation from the traditional
rights of others to use their property and energies in economic
pursuits free from government-imposed monopolies. As the Court
put it in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S.
315, 370 (1888), “[t]he United States, by issuing the patents . . . ,
has taken from the public rights of immense value, and bestowed
them upon the patentee. In this respect the government and its
officers are acting as the agents of the people, and have, under
the authority of law vested in them, taken from the people this
valuable privilege, and conferred it as an exclusive right upon the
patentee.” Thus, the Court has long explained that unlike
traditional forms of property, patents find their justification only
in the benefits they contribute to the public—and that the rights
of a patent holder should therefore be defined so as to maximize
the benefit to the public.71

Hence his claim—that patent rights are somehow “unlike
traditional property rights” insofar as they need a utilitarian
justification while property rights in land do not—is to wholly
misunderstand the intellectual history of private property rights. As I
wrote many years ago, it is a mistake to think that natural law rights
somehow survive and prosper even though they have no utilitarian
foundations.72 The truth is quite the opposite: the creation of exclusive
rights in land works, because once agriculture becomes the dominant
means of production, it is necessary to have permanent rights in land
in order for people who sow to know that they will be able to reap—a
point well understood by Blackstone.73 The only way in which this can
be done is to give secure property rights to others to treat the entire
earth as a common open to their use. Clement writes:
That condition underscores what the Framers and their forebears
well understood: patent rights are not natural rights, they do not
come from the common law, and they have no basis in the
tradition of property rights tracing back to John Locke. To the
Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophical Foun–
dations (1977).
71.

Clement, supra note 28, at 8. See infra pp. 727–28 for a discussion on the
inexact equivalence of exclusive rights compared to monopolies.

72.

See generally Epstein, supra note 21 (explaining that the connection be–
tween natural rights and utilitarian concerns has faded over time).

73.

2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *6–7.

716

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Patent Originalism
contrary, a patent is a form of government regulation that
restrains members of the public in the exercise of their natural
rights to liberty and property—rights that do come from nature
and are protected by the common law.74

Clement misses the close parallelism between the law of land and
the law of intellectual property, because private ownership of land
restricts the ability of others in the exercise of the natural rights to
move across areas, and the general proposition here is that the necessity
of privatization to give incentive to develop works as much for land as
it does for intellectual property.75 The basic conceit is that the overall
improvements in product are so vast that one does not have to worry
about any distributional constraint—precisely because the right of
occupation is open to all individuals and thus does not obviously favor
one person over another. Clearly this assumption can be subject to
attack as human density increases, but there is little doubt that the socalled natural law uses the same arguments to get private property
rights in land as it does for intellectual property. That is as utilitarian
as it gets.
It is also worth noting that utilitarian theories fully understand
that regimes of private ownership cannot extend to all physical
elements. Early on in Book II of Justinian’s Institutes, for example, he
recognizes a class of common property—water, air, the beach—that
cannot be reduced to private ownership.76 And it is only on utilitarian
grounds that it is possible to explain why this distinction is drawn in
the way it is, and why it continues to endure to this very day. Rivers
and trails and highways are long and skinny, and they are only of value
if they allow people to commute from one place to another. Hence where
the risks of holdout are high, property rights tend to be held in common,
with narrow exceptions made for private use—you may take refuge on
the beach during a storm.77 But where the need for production is
greater, private property with the right to exclude becomes the
dominant mode—again with exceptions in cases of necessity where one
person might take refuge in the hut or the dock of another in times of
stress. Exactly that distribution of rights exists for intellectual
property, for all the individual branches like patents and copyrights
presuppose that there is a core of public domain elements.78 The parallel
74.

Clement, supra note 28, at 1.

75.

See Epstein, supra note 68, at 16.

76.

J. Inst. 2.1.pr. to 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913).

77.

See id. at 2.1.5; see also John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity
and the Violation of Property Rights, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 651, 655–62 (2007).

78.

For discussion of the parallels, see Richard A. Epstein, The Basic Structure
of Intellectual Property Law, in The Oxford Handbook of
Intellectual Property Law 24, 27–29 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Justine
Pila eds., 2018).

717

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Patent Originalism

structures in both areas make it quite clear that intellectual property
rights are indeed full-fledged property rights, for which full protection
is appropriate.

III. The Particulars of the Patent Clause
This general orientation sets the stage for an examination of the
various parts of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.
A. To Promote the Progress of Sciences and the Useful Arts.

The opening words of the Patent Clause are “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,”79 which clearly operates as a limit–
ation on the overall scope of the grant. The use of the phrase “useful
[a]rts” is a cross between ordinary English and established historical
practice. In particular, it has been written that the notion of useful art
is bound up with the Greek term “techne,” which appears to cover at
the very least such skills as architecture and mechanical drawing, and
which is evoked when patent law refers to “persons having ordinary
skill in the art” (often abbreviated as PHOSITA)—a general test that
is not, and cannot be, tied to any particular field.80 Yet it is not only
important to figure out what these initial words include, but also to
gain some sense of what they exclude. The strongest evidence comes
from Adam Mossoff, who explains that the Crown granted patents for
exclusive rights for many reasons that had nothing to do with the
promotion of either invention or the useful arts.81 Most notably, patents
could be (and were) used to secure to private parties exclusive rights to
79.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

80.

Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 Yale L.J. 1590, 1604 (2011); see Karl B. Lutz, Patents
and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
32 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 83, 87 (1950); Sean M. O’Connor, The Lost “Art”
of the Patent System, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1397, 1401–06 (2015). O’Connor
notes: “Useful arts” originally referred to the practical skills and methods
of manufacture and craftsmanship taught as vocational subjects (i.e., ways
of making) as distinct from “liberal arts” which were academic subjects
taught for intellectual development (i.e., ways of thinking). Id.
For an exhaustive modern explanation of the relationship between art and
techne, see id. at 1399. (“The intellectual worldview in the West long
distinguished the mechanical arts from both sciences and liberal arts (and
later the fine arts). Patent systems emerged during the Renaissance to
incentivize invention, disclosure, and commercialization of advances in the
‘useful’ (i.e., practical, mechanical) arts. In the United States, Madison and
the Framers likely relied in substantial part on the famous French
Encyclopédie construction of ‘art’ as artisanal skill to authorize Congress to
grant exclusive rights to promote the progress of such skills.”).

81.

Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual
History, 1550–1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1259–64 (2001).
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import certain goods from overseas for sale in the United Kingdom.82
These patents were in no sense a quid pro quo for any invention or
discovery; the patents were for things that had already been invented
and discovered.83 Accordingly, these transactions did not secure the
advancement of human knowledge and well-being by rewarding private
parties for their new inventions and discoveries. Mossoff offers an
account of how Queen Elizabeth I issued patents that were in fact
complex bargains with private individuals, whereby a party who
received a letters patent from the Crown got the exclusive right to
introduce the new substance into the realm in ways that did not conflict
with established industries, and which served to train apprentices to
work in the relevant field.84 This theme is a variation on policies for the
protection of infant industries. The practice also created the ability to
create monopoly rents, which was not offset by any technological
advance. As Mossoff writes,
[L]etters patent had nothing to do with legal rights or even
inventions per se, but rather they represented royal privileges that
supported royal policies. In this case, the royal policy was the
introduction of new industries and manufactures to the realm,
and the royal privilege was a monopoly grant ascertained through
a letter patent.85

Economically, the exclusive franchise for importation should be
regarded as an alternative technique for the Crown to raise revenues by
imposing tariffs on goods imported from abroad, but that simple taxing
tool did not have the complex effects associated with the conditions
attached to the letters patent.86 The use of the introductory phrase,
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” is thus best
understood as an effort to prevent the use of patents as a franchise tool
or revenue device that would distort the competitive processes in the
United States. None of the patents issued under the Patent Act of 1790
82.

Id. at 1259–60.

83.

See id. at 1259–61; Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual
Origins of American Intellectual Property, 1790–1909, at 18
(2016).

84.

Mossoff, supra note 81, at 1261–63.

85.

Id. at 1261.

86.

See id. at 1259–64; see also Alfred Rive, A Brief History of Regulation and
Taxation of Tobacco in England, 9 Wm. & Mary Q. 1, 4–5 (1929); Stephen
D. Billington, Patent Costs and the Value of Inventions: Explaining Patent–
ing Behaviour between England, Ireland and Scotland, 1617–1852, at 9
(Queen’s University Centre for Economic History, Working Paper No.
2018–10, 2018), http://www.quceh.org.uk/uploads/1/0/5/5/10558478/wp
18-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8CP-K7X2] (refuting that patents were
primarily meant to provide revenue to the Crown).
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had anything to do with franchises issued to importers,87 for the
language of the statute tracks the language of the Patent Clause insofar
as it is limited to people who “have invented or discovered any useful
art.”88 There could be some difficulty in figuring out the range of useful
arts, which from the scientific context, like draftsmanship and model
building, probably did not mean to include literature or the decorative
or dramatic arts within the scope of the constitutional grant, general
literary and artistic endeavors are protected as writings.
Yet the one position that is surely incorrect is the suggestion that
this initial limitation in any way was meant to express any form of
disfavor to those patents covered by the 1790 Act, all of which remain
comfortably protected within the confines of the constitutional
provision. Paul Clement seriously misreads the clause when he writes:
The patent system must “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts,” rather than the private advantage of inventors and
speculators who do more to impede than to advance such
progress. Particularly problematic are systemic flaws that lead
the government to issue scores of patents that serve no legitimate
end.89

His fanciful reference to inventors and speculators is intended to
plant the suggestion that somehow a large subset of persons who meet
the requirements of the 1790 Patent Act should be condemned if they
fall into the latter category. But the short answer to this contention is
that the substantive requirements to obtain a patent supply all the
indicia that the patent granted is one that serves a sensible social
purpose. Therefore, uncertainty cuts in both directions, so that the
Clause could be read to indicate an uneasiness about using ad hoc tools
to block sensible patents that indeed do advance the useful arts.
More concretely, there are no useful inventions or improvements
thereon that surreptitiously create some form of illicit speculative
gamble. Indeed, Section 6 of the Patent Act does not restrict the parties
who can bring the action to the patentees, but it also includes executors
and administrators to cover cases where the patent passes either by will
or intestacy, or by assignment, which can take place by contract during
life, in much the same way as any other asset could be transferred.90
The basic theory is the same as it is for all other forms of property,
which is that assignment is encouraged because it tends to move any

87.

See Bracha, supra note 83, at 220.

88.

Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–11.

89.

Clement, supra note 28, at 2.

90.

Patent Act of 1790 § 6.
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asset, patents included, from a lower to a higher use.91 There is through–
out the patent law a studious effort, fully evidenced in the 1790 Act,
which conditions the grant of a patent on some showing that it will find
commercial success or turn a profit for its owner.92 Clearly the inventors
are not likely to patent various devices if they have no commercial
value, so the system of self-selection is what determines which subjects
get patented and which do not. It is a grossly misleading statement to
assume that the introductory clause, which was designed to deal with
patents to non-inventors, is somehow there in order to prevent “the
government [from] issu[ing] scores of patents that serve no legitimate
end,” a claim for which Clement offers no evidence of any kind.93
Nor is it accurate to claim, as Clement does, that the initial clause
should shape the way the Patent Clause should be read because Article
I, Section 8, Clause 8 “is alone among Congress’ enumerated powers in
that the Framers conditioned it on the performance of a specific public
purpose.”94 Those patents that are issued in accordance with the norms
stated in the statute satisfy that test, and meet that purpose. The
patent law operates at the wholesale level, and does not impose any
special limitations to eliminate certain patents on the kinds of grounds
that Clement nowhere specifies. Indeed, the proposition that the system
is rife with dubious patents has been attacked powerfully in many
articles.95 The creation of this patent system itself is imbued with a
critical social purpose. Indeed, the great danger is that if excessive limits
are imposed on patent grants, the system will fail its great social
purpose, as many valid patents will be unfairly invalidated or given in–
sufficient remedial protection, which is what happens with Alice/Mayo
on the one side, and eBay on the other.96 Nothing suggests that the

91.

See Harold Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J.L. & Econ.
61, 62 (1966).

92.

Patent Act of 1790 §§ 1, 2, 4; see Chauncey Smith, A Century of Patent
Law, 5 Q.J. Economics 44, 61–64 (1890).

93.

Clement, supra note 28, at 2.

94.

Id. at 6–7.

95.

See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 881,
883 (2015) (“Importantly, more opportunities to challenge issued patents
also means more opportunities to engage in abusive practices to undermine
legitimate patent rights.”). Dolin then shows how the efforts to rid the
system of low-quality patents ignore the costs of its cure. Id. at 897–99.

96.

Id. at 882–83; Edward Van Gieson & Paul Stellman, Killing Good Patents
to Wipe out Bad Patents: Bilski, the Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter
Rules, and the Inability to Save Valuable Patents Using the Reissue Statute,
27 Santa Clara Comput. & High Tech. L.J. 403, 439 (2010); Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212, 216–18, 225–26 (2014); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–73,
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introductory phrase of the Patent Clause was intended to signal that
patents are less than full-fledged property rights.
B. “By securing . . . the exclusive right.”

The second component of the Patent Clause provides for “securing”
exclusive rights for authors and inventors. The question here is what
meaning should be attached to that phrase. Start with the term
“security,” whose standard definition connotes freedom from risk, fear,
or anxiety, typically without specifying either the interest to be
protected or the source of the threat.97 More concretely for these
purposes, the term in the eighteenth century was closely associated with
the security of possession.98 That notion is prominent in the writings of
David Hume, who writes: “[I]t is well known, that men’s happiness
consists not so much in an abundance of [the commodities and
enjoyments of life], as in the peace and security with which they possess
them.”99 Or elsewhere: “Who sees not, for instance, that whatever is
produced or improved by a man’s art or industry ought, for ever, to be
secured to him, in order to give encouragement to such useful habits
and accomplishments?”100
The point here is simple enough. If persons do not have the security
of possession, then others are able to take what they have with impunity
and turn it to their own advantage, until they too are forced out of
their possession. The issue was so important historically that it was
commonly said that the protection of real estate was heavily organized
around the notion of possession. An example is the writ novel disseisin
(recent dispossession), which allowed the party dispossessed of property
to regain it from the party who took it without having to show owner–
ship of the property in question.101 That tension between possession and
77–78, 82, 87, 92 (2012); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
391–94 (2006).
97.

See, e.g., Security, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse
/security [https://perma.cc/E6F5-G27S] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020);
Security, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/security [https://perma.cc/YCP2-EDB6] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).

98.

See 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language
(4th ed. 1777).

99.

1 David Hume, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects 49 (n. ed.
1825) (1742).

100. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 28
(1751).
101. Maitland, supra note 39, at 22–23. The so-called possessory assizes also
included mort d’ancestor, which allowed the descendant of the decedent to
recover possession of the land from an interloper who took possession of it
after the death of the ancestor but before the ancestor could enter the
property in possession. Id. at 22–25.
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ownership was demonstrated by the proposition that in novel disseisin
it was not part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case to show that he had a
higher title to the property.102 The use of an expeditious remedy to
restore possession had the great advantage that in most cases it put an
end to the dispute, for in the large run of cases the party in possession
was also the true owner of the property in dispute.103 The simplification
thus allowed the true owner to win while sparing him the need to trace
back title to some indisputable grant, such as one from the Crown. And
in those where the title was in dispute, the dispossessor could, after he
was required to surrender position, maintain an action called the Writ
of Right to establish that superior title in the few cases where ownership
and possession were separated.104
Note that in all these cases the remedy for the dispossession was
the return of the possession.105 It was never the case that the party who
was forced off the land was told to make do with a sum of money that
represented the fair market value of the property in question. These
private forced purchases would have routinely circumvented voluntary
market transactions, leaving the true owner out in the cold with a
genuine uncertainty of whether he would be paid in due course a
suitable amount, which is hard to determine with land because of its
inherent subjective value. Damages are thus a wholly inadequate
remedy, and the widescale situation in which dispossession routinely
occurs is ample evidence that the security of possession is necessary for
civil peace in society.
To be sure, over time, the notion of “clean-up” damage for the loss
of interim use, or for the partial destruction of the property in question,
was made part of the overall picture.106 And surely if dispossession was
followed by the destruction of structures or the removal of valuable
minerals, a full system of rewards would have to strip the defendant of
those gains in order to make sure that this willful circumvention of the
legal rules did not have disastrous collateral consequences.107 Thus it is
often the case that a mixture of injunctive relief and damages is
102. See id. at 22–23.
103. See Tessa Shepperson, The Petty Assizes and the Development of the Jury
System, Hist. L. Blog, http://historyoflaw.co.uk/petty-assizes-develop
ment-of-jury-system/ [https://perma.cc/G22P-MS5N] (last visited Oct.
10, 2020).
104. Id.; Maitland, supra note 39, at 23–24.
105. See Maitland, supra note 39, at 22–25.
106. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of
Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 909, 915–16 (2007).
107. See A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation,
100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 320, 349–52 (1951); see also Wooden-ware Co. v. United
States, 106 U.S. 432, 434, 437 (1882).
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required, so that it becomes a mistake to follow the analysis of Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, who posit that injunctions and
damages are opposites, not complements, in particular cases, and then
proceed to show the serious holdout questions that arise from
injunctions and the risks of misappropriations that arise from
damages.108 As I have written elsewhere:
[U]nlike the oversimplified model of damages versus injunctive
relief developed by Professors Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed, the use of injunctions and damages are more often
complements than substitutes. The injunctive side of the equation
allows for conditional injunctions, bound by levels and time of
emissions. The damage side picks up the slack where the
injunctive relief backs off. By starting with the former and moving
cautiously to the latter, the total level of dislocations is far lower
than moving to a corner position in which one of these remedies
is adopted to the exclusion of the other.109

This discussion sets the stage for the protection of patents. It is
commonly understood that intellectual property is in some sense a nonrivalrous good.110 Unlike the situation with land, an invention can be
used both by the party who owns it and by some outsider. The use by
the second party, or indeed any number of second parties, does not
prevent any person from using it himself. This argument has often been
used to suggest that no patent protection is needed at all, because so
long as the owner is not forced to abandon use of the patented
technology, why worry if someone else uses it?111 Yet that argument
does not meet the constitutional standard, because the Constitution is
not limited to protecting the right of an inventor to use his own
inventions. It also protects the exclusive right to those inventions, which
presumptively means that no one else is allowed to use that invention
in another physical instantiation without the permission of the owner.
108. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089,
1115–23 (1972).
109. Richard A. Epstein, Positive and Negative Externalities in Real Estate
Development, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 1493, 1509 (2018) (footnotes omitted).
110. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property
Power, 94 Geo. L.J. 1771, 1797 (2006).
111. See Stan Liebowitz, Intellectual Property, Libr. Econ. & Liberty, https://
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/IntellectualProperty.html [https://perma.cc/
P9N5-ZY6U] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); Brink Lindsey & Daniel Takash,
Why “Intellectual Property” is a Misnomer, Niskanen Ctr., Sept. 10, 2019,
at 5–8, 10–13, https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
09/LT_IPMisnomer-2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ8F-C8T6].
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Clearly, that exclusive element really matters, for if others are
entitled to use the invention freely, then they are also free to sell it to
other individuals, who can also make use of the technology without
denying to its owner the right to exclusive use. In their paper, Why
‘Intellectual Property’ is a Misnomer,112 Brink Lindsey and Daniel
Takash take the position that I can still sing a tune that I wrote even
if my neighbor may sing it as well.113 That is clearly a case of copyright,
and it is worth noting that nobody who has ever sold sheet music or
records has insisted that the party who buys it never sing the song
privately—a total absurdity, as holding one liable for copyright
infringement for a public performance lies at the heart of copyright
violations.114 Rather, the expectation is that the gains from sale will be
increased if the buyer is entitled to make that private use. Indeed, the
social expectation with songs is that the exclusive right of copyright
never prevents that from taking place.
But there are two decisive objections to this example. The first is
that it is quite a different proposition if the outsider goes into the
business of selling sheet music or recordings himself. He can prepare
these at a lower cost than the original composer because he need not
incur the cost of composition, but only the costs of selling the completed
work. This creates a complete inversion in the marketplace, where the
returns from sale are greater for the interloper than for the original
composer. Exactly the same thing takes place with inventions. Absent
patent protection, commercialization for sales to third parties is more
cheaply done by the infringer than by the inventor—which clearly has
massive impacts on the willingness to create the invention in the first
place.115 And, unlike the copyright, inventions do not have that nice
feature that everyone can sing along. It is of course the case that you
can lend your patented tool to your neighbor, which increases the
amount that can be commanded on the original sale. But again, the
right of commercialization—making a new article of that same tool for
sale by the non-inventor—is the death knell to an invention because it
puts the inventor at a systematic disadvantage to the interloper.
Lindsey and Takash wholly ignore this important competitive situation.
At this point, it becomes clear why the Patent Clause refers to
exclusive rights: it is only that configuration that allows the inventor
(or assignee) to sue for an injunction that stops unauthorized commer–
cialization and prevents the collapse of innovation in product and
service markets. Once the injunction is in place, it means the interloper
112. Lindsey & Takash, supra note 111.
113. Id. at 5–7.
114. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2018) (containing exten–
sive provisions that govern various kinds of public performances).
115. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a Climate of Intellectual
Property Rights Skepticism, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 103, 147 (2016).
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presumptively can be stopped from making or selling the infringing
product, which is the first step in stopping the loss of patent rights.
But injunctions in patent cases have to share many of the attributes
that they have in nuisance and other cases, because they cannot be
considered automatically proper in the full range of cases. For example,
injunctions are often insufficient in those cases in which the inventor is
unaware that some infringing goods have already been sold to third
persons who may or may not know about their infringing nature.
At this point, it is quite clear that the constitutional text does not
offer a complete guide as to what remedial choices are appropriate. That
point is recognized by Section 4 of the Patent Act of 1790, which
contains additional remedies that explicitly vindicate “the sole and
exclusive right” of the patentee and various assignees by holding that:
[E]very person so offending, shall forfeit and pay to the said
patentee or patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators
or assigns such damages as shall be assessed by a jury, and more–
over shall forfeit to the person aggrieved, the thing or things so
devised, made, constructed, used, employed or vended, contrary
to the true intent of this act, which may be recovered in an action
on the case founded on this act.116

These non-injunctive remedies were, if anything, strengthened in
both the 1793 Patent Act which allowed at least three times the
standard royalties,117 and in the 1800 Patent Act which allowed for “a
sum equal to three times the actual damage sustained.”118 This tighten–
ing set of damage awards is flatly inconsistent with the view that the
Framers treated patent rights as second-class rights. Indeed, the
purpose of all these damages is to replicate the same objective that is
sought in cases of willful conversion of tangible objects, where the willful
wrongdoer is forced to turn over the compensation that he receives
without getting any offset for the costs needed to produce the object in
question.119 The purpose of this rule is to create strong incentives not
to take property by making sure the willful infringer is always left worse
off after the breach than if no breach had occurred at all.120 The rule
was different in cases of innocent conversion—that is, those situations
where there was an intention to take the property in question, but in
116. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
117. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, Stat. 318, 322 (“[A] sum, that shall be at
least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold
or licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention . . . .”).
118. Patent Act of 1800, ch. 26, § 3, 2 Stat 37, 38.
119. See, e.g., Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 434–37 (1882);
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928–29 (2016).
120. Wooden-Ware Co., 106 U.S. at 437; Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. at 1928–29.
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the honest belief that the taker was either the owner of the property or
had received a license from the owner to take the goods in question.
There, deterrence is not an issue, so the emphasis switches to ensuring
that the owner of the property is not unjustly enriched by the innocent
contribution of the good faith improver.121
These rules are well-entrenched for physical property, but it is
unclear from the text of Section 4 whether some adjustments in the
remedial structure should be taken in the few cases of innocent
infringement. It is, in contrast, clear that while the 1790 Patent Act
does not refer to an injunction, it can hardly be said by way of gloss
that this remedy should be ruled out of bounds as a matter of course
just because damages and seizure of goods exist as potential remedies
for all cases. At this point it is instructive to note that in Article III,
Section 2, it says that “[t]he judicial Power [of the United States] shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties,” which surely covers cases
under the 1790 Patent Act.122 This Clause also makes it clear that an
injunction, as a close substitute to the statutory provisions under
Section 4, should be allowed to achieve the same end as the statutory
remedies in Section 4. It is equally clear that subsequent statutes are
well within the constitutional ambit when they offer injunctive relief as
part of the standard suite of equitable remedies for any continuing
violation of a property right, in parallel to the copyright decision in
Morse v. Reid.123 Thus the key provision of 35 U.S.C. § 283 rounds out
the circle when it says:
The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title
may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity
to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such
terms as the court deems reasonable.

The sensible way to read this provision is to follow the general
principles of equity by starting with the use of the injunction, which is
in turn modified to take into account exceptional circumstances. An
innocent manufacturer, in good faith, could receive the right to sell
goods already made. For example, the manufacturer could be allowed
to sell existing stock in exchange for the payment of a higher-than-usual
royalty within some limited period, even if it is prohibited from making
121. See Restatement (Third) Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 40
& Illus. 14 (Am. Law Inst. 2011); Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 313–
14 (1871).
122. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Patent Act of 1790 § 4.
123. See supra notes 116–118; Morse v. Reed, 17 F. Cas. 873, 873 (C.C.D.N.Y.
1796) (Case No. 9,860); see also John D. Gordan, III, The First Reported
Federal Copyright Case, 11 L. & Hist. Rev. 21, 22 (1993).
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new items within the same class. (That option appears to be foreclosed
under the 1790 Act.) At this point the infringer has the opportunity to
redesign the infringing product to eliminate its infringing conditions.
But these “principles of equity”124 are not meant to repeal the basic rule
that enjoins direct competition from an infringer. Accordingly, the rule
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. bears no relation to the tests for
injunctions needed to protect the patent’s exclusive right. The eBay
test is as follows:
[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a fourfactor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2)
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.125

The exact origin of this test is somewhat mysterious because it is
not anchored in any reference to earlier practice. Indeed, earlier practice
proceeded along very different lines.126 The first two provisions invert
the correct analysis, which starts with the presumption that the
injunction is the remedy of course and then limits that remedy to avoid
any possible abuse of right. This presumption is warranted because
damages alone are always inadequate as a sole remedy to deal with
future, deliberate patent violations uncertain in scope and severity.
Damages reduce the status of the patent holder to that of an unsecured
creditor seeking payment that could take years to collect from a party
who could, in the interim, secrete assets elsewhere or go out of business.
The third eBay factor compounds the blunder when it introduces a
balance-of-hardships test, which formed no part of any of the earlier
rules that treated actual damages, multiples of actual damages, and
forfeiture of goods as routine remedies. Hardship may allow for marginal
adjustments in the timing and scope of the remedy, but that approach
never revisits the question of whether “a remedy in equity” is warr–
anted, when the norm is that such is routinely allowed. And the fourth
factor introduces the wild card of the “public interest” on a case-bycase basis, which is contrary to the working presumption that the
advancement of knowledge secured by patents makes their protection a
matter of the highest public interest. On the proper view, it would take
some dire public necessity—when all property rights are routinely
124. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
125. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
126. See Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of
Petitioners at 2–3, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No.
05-130), 2006 WL 1785363.
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abridged for the duration of the necessity—to suspend the injunction.
It should therefore be painfully clear that Paul Clement gets matters
grievously out of whack when he writes:
The government has taken a number of steps to address the
problems outlined above. These developments include Congress’
decision in 2011 to enact inter partes review, which makes it easier
for the PTO to identify and cancel patents that were issued in
error, and the Supreme Court’s decision in [eBay,] which ensures
that patents do not receive favorable treatment compared to
traditional property rights when seeking injunctions in court.
Together these developments help bring the patent system
somewhat closer to the constitutional vision the Framers had for
it.127

At this point Clement defends the Supreme Court decision in Oil
States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC,128 which
allows for the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reexamine patents
after they have been issued.129 I have critiqued Justice Thomas’s opinion
in great detail elsewhere, concluding that he misread every case he cited
in Oil States.130 Suffice it to say that the 1790 Act recognized that
patents were grants from the United States government. These grants,
like grants of real property, vest at the time that they are made, so that
the only way in which they can be set aside is in a judicial forum by
showing some defect in their formation. Justice Thomas sought to
deflect that conclusion by insisting that patents should be regarded as
public rights under the doctrine of Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co.131 Murray’s Lessee applied the public rights doc–
trine to customs disputes and extended it to cover any case in which a
property right had been created pursuant to statute, including, of

127. Clement, supra note 28, at 16 (internal citation omitted).
128. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
129. Id. at 1371–72, 1374.
130. Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform: PostDecision Article: Inter Partes Review Under the AIA Undermines the
Structural Protections Offered by Article III Courts, 19 Federalist Soc’y
Rev. 132 (2018). For two earlier companion pieces, see Richard A. Epstein,
The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform: Pre-Argument Article: Why
the Supreme Court Should End Inter Partes Review in Oil States, 19
Federalist Soc’y Rev. 116 (2018); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme
Court Tackles Patent Reform: Post-Argument Article: Further Reflections
on the Oil States Case after Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court, 19
Federalist Soc’y Rev. 124 (2018).
131. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856); Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at
1373–74 (quoting Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284).
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course, patents.132 By Justice Thomas’s logic, the entire judicial system
could be ousted in all patent disputes, not just at the trial level but
also on all appeals. Yet clearly the judicial power must cover statutory
causes of action, for the entire system of separation of powers is at an
end if the resolution of all disputes arising under statute can be removed
to administrative tribunals that have none of the safeguards of Article
III courts.
To reach his result, Justice Thomas gave a highly inaccurate
account of the relevant precedents, which all held that once the grant—
whether of land or a patent—was final, it could be set aside only in a
judicial proceeding.133 Thus, the Supreme Court in McCormick
Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman134 could not have been more
explicit when it wrote:
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that
when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of the
Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents, and has
had affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has passed beyond
the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be
revoked or cancelled by the President, or any other officer of the
Government. United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378; United States
v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363. It has become the
property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal
protection as other property. Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516;
Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225; United States v. Palmer, 128
U.S. 262, 271, citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356.
The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to
annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the
courts of the United States, and not in the department which
issued the patent. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533; United
States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364; Michigan
Land and Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 589, 593. And in this
respect a patent for an invention stands in the same position and
is subject to the same limitations as a patent for a grant of
lands.135

All of the cited cases stand for the propositions cited, and Justice
Thomas was plainly wrong to treat those decisions as though they were

132. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284–85.
133. Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1376 (citing McCormick Harvesting
Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898); United States v. Am. Bell
Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364, 371 (1888)).
134. 169 U.S. 606 (1898).
135. Id. at 608–09.
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quirks of the Patent Act of 1870.136 Rather, the principle that patent
grants confer property rights unalterable by administrative agencies is
a general one that applies to all transactions, regardless of which
particular patent statute is in effect at any given time. “But those cases
were decided under the Patent Act of 1870.”137 His reasoning gets it
exactly backwards. The Patent Act of 1870 did not include such a
provision because it was widely understood that such a provision was
unconstitutional. Oil States was wrongly decided precisely because it
rejected the notion that patent grants create exclusive property rights,
just as was intended by the constitutional Framers.
C. Limited Terms.

The last relevant feature of the constitutional design for patents is
the requirement that these patents be only for limited terms.138 That
limitation was inserted because it tracked past practices for patents.
The source of the limitation is both simple and profound. A patent, by
creating an exclusive right, does limit the use of a given invention; this
counts as a social loss offset by the incentive to invent. It should be
stressed that an exclusive right is not a monopoly unless there are no
close substitutes for an invention, just as the exclusive right to 100
Main Street does not make it the only house in town. And the patent
law is so structured that one cannot patent a field but only an
invention, which leaves the way open for new entrants who can take
advantage of the knowledge that the successful patentee had to include
in his patent application.139 The existence of an exclusive right does not,
of course, eliminate the prospect that the holder of the device will
receive Ricardian rents, which are always obtainable in competitive
markets, by obtaining some of its inputs at below-market prices.140 This
136. Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1376 (“That version of the Patent
Act did not include any provision for post-issuance administrative review.”).
137. Id.
138. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
139. See General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. Pat. & Trademark
Off. (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/gen
eral-information-concerning-patents#heading-4 [https://perma.cc/7HCB
-TN2L].
140. Suppose there are two parties who own coal, one of whose coal is close to
the surface and therefore easy to extract at a cost of $10. The other’s coal
lies deeper and can be extracted at the cost of $20. If the price of coal is $25,
the first earns $10 in Ricardian rents that the second does not, but both sell
at the competitive price of say, $25. The situation is quite different if all coal
miners could agree on a price of $30, which would create distortions. Note
that if the first party sells his property to another, the sales price will include
the present discounted value of the future Ricardian rents from the property
so that his buyer will only earn the normal competitive rate of return. Note
also that Ricardian rents do not create an umbrella for new entry, but
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point seems implicitly acknowledged in the nineteenth-century cases
that distinguished between exclusive rights, which are usually procompetitive, and monopoly power, which is definitionally anti-compet–
itive.141
Yet there are cases in which the new patented object does not face
any direct competitors, and thus will be able to extract a set of
monopoly rents. The limitation of terms is a limit on that power as
well: after the time has run, others can make the invention so that the
original patentee forgoes the initial benefit of his exclusive right. The
exact period of time is not specified in the Constitution, but it seems
clear that a limited term cannot be, say, a million years, which is
functionally indistinguishable from perpetual ownership. The 1790
Patent Act set the term at a maximum of fourteen years, with no
allowance for periods of renewal.142 This stands in stark contrast to the
far longer periods allowed for copyrights, which at present under the
Copyright Term Extension Act may extend up to 70 years after an
author’s death: the commercial context offers no strong rationale to tie
the duration of a copyright to the life of the inventor.143 For patents,
there is nothing magical about fourteen years, and in some cases, as
with pharmaceutical patents covered by the Hatch-Waxman Act of
1984, allowances have to be made for those patented devices that
cannot be sold because they are tied up in reviews by the Food and
Drug Administration.144 Yet even if copyrights can run too long, the
difference between patents and copyrights is evident because there are
few inventions that will not be discovered in the ordinary course of
business. So, for example, a ninety-nine-year patent period for a
telephone would overlook the simple fact that there were rival applic–
ations before the Patent Office when Alexander Graham Bell received
his patent.145 So, the patent is intended to speed up production by
awarding protection only for the rate at which discovery is usefully
hastened.

monopoly rents do. See Joseph Shaanan, Ricardian or Monopoly Rents? The
Perspective of Potential Entrants, 32 E. Econ. J. 19, 19–20 (2006).
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
142. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10.
143. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105–298 § 102, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827–28 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302).
144. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman)
Act, Pub. L. No. 98–417 § 201, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (1984) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 156).
145. Who is Credited With Inventing the Telephone?, Libr. of Cong. (Nov.
19, 2019), https://www.loc.gov/everyday-mysteries/item/who-is-credited
-with-inventing-the-telephone/ [https://perma.cc/8NEC-CMB9].

732

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Patent Originalism

The system of limited terms makes perfectly good sense, but it does
not detract from the observation that patents, so limited, are fully
vested property rights in the same fashion as leases and life estates. For
patents to be efficient during the period for which they run, they have
to have all the attributes that were recognized in the 1790 Patent Act,
which includes the rights to sue and to license, and to obtain strong
protection against intruders.146 The term limit therefore does nothing to
undermine the claim that patents are property in the strong sense of
the word, which is just the way the matter was understood during the
Founding period.

Conclusion
Patent protection goes through strong and weak cycles. For the
past twenty years there has been a determined effort to cut back on the
scope of patent rights, both by judicial decision and the passage of the
America Invents Act.147 I regard most of these initiatives as unwise not
because I believe everything should be patented, nor that all patents
should receive the strongest possible protection for the longest period
of time. Rather, the defense of the earlier order is more nuanced, and
it starts with the claim that patent rights are property rights that
should receive the appropriate level of protection. That does not mean
that patent rights should be able to obliterate the patent commons of
general ideas and natural substances; nor does it mean that they should
be perpetual in length or subject to injunctive relief in any and all cases.
But it does mean that the efforts to reframe patent law should not be
curbed by the Alice/Mayo doctrine. Further, injunctions and strong
damages should be the presumption in cases of deliberate infringement,
and patents should not be routinely invalidated through administrative
proceedings. Patent rights are obtained by grant, and they should be
protected by the remedies ordinarily given to grantees. There have been
many efforts, such as that by Paul Clement, to insist that patents did
not receive this form of protection during the Founding Period. But
those claims are demonstrably false, as there is no indication that either
the Constitution or the Patent Act of 1790 tend to withhold from
patents, once issued, the same level of protection that was, and is,
afforded other forms of property. What were sound constitutional
principles then are sound constitutional principles today, and the recent
cases that have deviated from those principles should be condemned for
their constitutional infidelity and for the social inefficiencies that they
introduce.

146. Patent Act of 1790 § 4.
147. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).

733

